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INTRODUCTION 
The interconnection of electricity networks is considered to be an essential precondition for 
the realization of an integrated, competitive and sustainable European electricity market. The 
European Commission has reiterated the conclusion of the European Council in 2014 October 
on the target of achieving interconnection of at least 10% of the installed electricity 
production capacity for all Member States by 2020 in the context of the envisaged Energy 
Union, and extended the 2020 interconnection target to 15% by 2030.1 The Communication 
identifies widespread benefits deriving from well interconnected energy systems:    
• increase of security of supply 
• affordable prices via market integration 
• decarbonisation: accommodation of increasing level of renewable generation. 
The 10% interconnection indicator is more than an academic benchmark: it will serve as the 
basis of EU fund allocation. The interconnection target is planned to be reached through the 
implementation of the Projects of Common Interest (PCIs) with special priority given to those 
projects where the current interconnection capacity is well below the 10% objective. In 
addition to the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF) the European Structural and Investment 
Fund launched in early 2015 could provide funding for such PCIs.  
The aims of the present paper are twofold. First, it analyses the applicability of the 10% 
interconnection indicator with respect to medium/long term security of supply and market 
integration: Does it accurately consider the SOS situation of the Member States? Does it 
reflect the level of market integration of the neighbouring Member States/regions? Second, it 
estimates the effect of full compliance with the 10% interconnection target on EU wide CO2 
emissions by 2020. 
We find that the 10% rule that aims at improving both the security of supply and market 
integration position of countries fails to do so. It disregards factors that affect security of 
supply (availability of generating capacities and load) and with respect to market integration 
the criterion misses the level of analysis i.e. focusing on countries instead of borders. 
SECURITY OF SUPPLY 
Energy security is one of the main pillars of EU energy policy and it is a fundamental concern 
of national energy policies as well.  The 2009 Ukrainian gas crisis highlighted the 
vulnerability and adaptation skills of the European gas market and infrastructure. Security of 
supply (SOS) can be analysed in different time horizons both for gas and electricity. Kaderják 
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(2011) provides an overview of the potential indices for short and medium/long term for both 
energy carriers. The medium/long term security of supply position of a country in terms of 
electricity supply depends on various factors such as the origin of resources, the generation 
and transport infrastructure and also the level and variability of consumption. Gouveira et al. 
(2014) analyse the impact of higher renewable penetration on the SOS situation of Portugal 
using utilisation rate for interconnectors, gross capacity margin (based on installed capacity 
and annual peak demand) and de-rated capacity (considering the capacity factor of each 
technology). Portugal-Pereira et al. (2014) prepared a similar analysis for Japan and assessed 
the security of supply consequences of various generation portfolio scenarios for 2030. The 
infrastructure component of this analysis uses a system stress indicator (the period when the 
system reaches 85% of total electricity supply capacity) as this analysis considers the daily 
fluctuation of load and production as well.  
The 10% interconnection target set by the EU is based on the net installed generation capacity 
(NGC) and the net transfer capacity of interconnectors (NTC_I). The group of 9 countries 
below (or equal to) this level of interconnection in 2014 consists of Germany, Spain, France, 
Great Britain, Ireland, Italy, Poland, Portugal and Romania.2 
The 10% interconnection target does not reflect the fact the installed capacities are not always 
available and the security of supply position of a Member State is affected not only by the 
supply side capacities (transfer and generation) but by the load as well.3  Reliable available 
capacity (RAC) is - on the ENTSO-E average - 69% of the net generation capacity (NGC) and 
this deviation is due to Maintenance and Overhauls, Outages and System Services Reserve 
and Non-Usable Capacity that is closely linked to variable RES penetration because of the 
limited availability of certain primary energy sources. Substituting NGC with RAC alters the 
position of some Member States with high RES penetration (DK, DE) and Slovakia. If the 
threshold for critical countries is set at 15% (considering the lower level of RAC compared to 
NGC) then only Bulgaria joins the group of 7 critical countries and no one exits the group.   
In order to include both the availability of generation capacity and the load of the country in 
the approximation of “interconnectedness” we have constructed the following indicator that 
measures the residual supply capacity compared to peak load (PL):  (NTC_I+RAC-PL)/PL.4 
                                                          
2 In our analysis we considered the Baltic states individually but did not include Malta and Cyprus as opposed to 
the list of the Communication. 
3 Data used in the calculations are the from SO&AF 2014-2030 Dataset of ENTSO-E and all refer to January 
2014 and Scenario A (“Conservative”) that is derived from Scenario B („Best Estimate”), taking into account 
only the generating capacity developments which are considered secure. 
4 Kaderják (2011) uses a similar medium term security of supply index for electricity: NTC_I+RAC-PL)/NGC. 
Residual supply index – in the context of short term gas security of supply – measures the effect of the outage of 
the single largest import infrastructure. 
 
                       
 
 
 
                
   
 
On the basis of this indicator the original group of 9 critical countries alters. Whereas there is 
a core group that performs poorly according to both indicators (Poland, GB, Spain, France 
and Germany), on the basis of our indicator the critical group is extended to Belgium, Finland, 
Norway and Hungary (at a 40% threshold). These countries rely more heavily on imports to 
meet their peak load and as such for them the interconnection level available for import is 
more important. These countries need import capacity to cover their peak load but have 
moderate interconnections. On the other hand countries that have relatively large generation 
capacities and are less reliant on import capacities, such as Portugal, Italy, Ireland and 
Romania, exit the critical group at 40%. In sum, the two indexes arrive in partially 
overlapping but fundamentally different results. We believe that the incorporation of load and 
the discounting of net generation capacities due to availability improve the indicator. 
Figure 1: Performance of EU countries (plus Norway and Switzerland) against the residual supply 
capacity and the 10% target indicator 
 
Note: Austria is not included in the figure as ENTSO-E does not define NTC_I for Austria. 
PRICE CONVERGENCE 
Failure to reach the 10% interconnection level is claimed to be a red flag signalling a 
bottleneck in market integration and, as such, it is meant to direct attention and funding to 
these borders. We argue the identification of these bottlenecks is more appropriate on the 
basis of wholesale price convergence among the countries. First we have an overview of the 
literature dealing with the European price convergence, focusing on those studies using higher 
geographical coverage or more recent data on the European wholesale electricity prices 
                       
 
 
 
                
   
 
applying various statistical methods to assess market integrations. Then we introduce two 
straightforward price convergence indices as a measure of the market integration of the 
various European countries, which could serve as basis for our assessment.  
Price convergence literature 
Price convergence of European electricity markets is a well-researched field. Several studies 
assess if price convergence takes place in Europe as an assumed consequence of the energy 
policy instruments targeting an integrated electricity market (Table 1). The methodologies 
differ in many dimensions such as the time horizon of the analysis (short or medium-long 
term price convergence) or the geographical scope (two-country comparison or regional 
assessment). They also differ in their objectives: many search for relationship of prices in the 
analysed markets, while others look for potential events that disrupt the normal functioning of 
the electricity markets. The assessments are usually limited by data availability as many 
energy exchanges had more limited liquidity in the first years of operation.  
Table 1: Studies assessing price convergence in the EU electricity markets 
Author Method Coverage Time series Price used Result 
Zachmann 
(2008) 
Principal Component 
Analysis and Unit 
root (KPSS and ADF) 
11 EU power 
exchanges (NL, DE, 
AT, DK-E, DK-W, SE, 
FR, PL, GB, ES, CZ) 
2002-2006 Hourly day-
ahead 
prices 
No full integration in 
the EU electricity 
markets, some bilateral 
convergence 
Armstrong-
Galli (2005) 
Exploratory data 
approach 
FR, DE, NL, ES 2002-2004 Day-ahead 
prices 
Price convergence 
Bunn-
Gianfreda 
(2010) 
Causality tests, 
cointegration, 
impulse-response 
technique 
FR, DE, GB, NL, ES 2001-2005 Day- ahead, 
1 and 2 
month 
ahead price 
Increasing integration 
Cassagneto-
Gissey et al. 
(2014) 
Dynamic Granger 
causality 
12 EU members (BL, 
DK, FI, FR, DE, IT, NL, 
NO, PL, ES, SE, CH, 
GB) 
2007-2012  Price integration  
increases with market 
coupling 
Pellini 
(2013) 
Fractional 
cointegration, 
multivariate GARCH 
model, dynamic 
conditional 
correlation  (DCC) 
models 
AT, BL, CZ, FR, DE, GR, 
IE, IT, Pl, PT, 
Nordpool, CH, NL, GB 
Varying,  
1998-2012 
 
Day- ahead 
prices, 
hourly and 
half hourly 
41 out of 105 market 
pairs present 
convergence. (mainly 
core continental 
countries) 61 pairs 
show no convergence 
De 
Menezes-
Houllier 
(2014) 
Fractional 
cointegration 
9 EU spot markets 
(APX-UK, APX-NL, 
Belpex, EPEX-FR, 
EPEX-DE, IPEX, 
Nordpool, Omel, OTE) 
2000-2013 Daily spot 
prices and 
one-month-
ahead price 
Increased convergence 
and greater reactivity 
to shocks 
 
                       
 
 
 
                
   
 
These studies arrive at diverse conclusions: depending on the methodology, the covered 
market and used time series they either reject or support higher electricity market and price 
integration. Most studies use shorter time series (3-5 years) so the conclusions depend 
strongly on the timeframe of the data. A recent study using the long time series (de Menezes, 
2014) shows that the time series of hourly spot prices are a fractionally integrated and mean 
reverting, so the conclusion of the author’s is that the frequently applied unit-root tests alone 
are inadequate to assess electricity spot market convergence. Pellini (2013) used long time 
series data to study borders rather than countries and found that there is a core country group 
(continental Europe) that has reached significant level of convergence, while the rest of the 
markets are not converging. Interestingly, Pellini found that the Noordpool market shows 
little evidence of convergence to the core continental group and explained it by the very 
different composition of the Northern national generation portfolios compared to the 
continental core (similar to Italy). She concludes that “the level of interconnectivity and 
geographical proximity play the most important role in explaining volatility transmission 
across regional markets and hence market integration” (Pellini, 2013, p33). Interestingly, 
most of these studies use only price information to capture integration and pay no attention to 
additional driving factors, e.g. joining a coupling process, starting a new interconnector or 
new allocation method of the available interconnection capacities. ACER/CEER (2014) 
analysed the efficient use of interconnectors in the context of market integration. According to 
their assessment the efficient use of the interconnectors in the ‘right direction’ (export from 
low priced region to higher priced one) is continuously increased from 2010 to 2013 reaching 
77% of efficient use of the cross border capacities. Their assessment also underlines the 
ongoing market integration process where ACER expects further efficiency gains if more 
markets will be coupled in the future. 
To illustrate price convergence, the following figure shows the evolution of the difference 
between the German and Czech electricity exchange prices (EEX-OTE) in the period of 2008-
2014. The figure also shows the 10-90% quantiles similar to Armstrong-Galli (2005) for each 
year (Yearly 10% and Yearly 90%).  
                       
 
 
 
                
   
 
Figure 2: Price difference between the German and Czech electricity exchange day-ahead baseload prices 
(€/MWh, daily averages, 2008-2014) 
 
The figure effectively illustrates the converging prices in the two exchanges between 2008 
and 2012: the difference between the two quantiles (10% and 90%) reduced from 15 €/MWh 
to 7 €/MWh. From 2013 the gap started to increase again, and interestingly it also had a bias 
toward a higher positive divergence (positive value means higher EEX prices). This data 
illustrates that a study based on a period of 2008-2012 would probably support the price 
convergence hypothesis while the inclusion of 2013 and 2014 would challenge it, if no further 
information is included in the assessment. 
Factors that could affect price convergence: 
• Higher RES penetration levels in the connected markets: intermittent RES generation 
(wind and solar) increase price variability the extent of which depends on its 
scheduling regime  
• Geographical proximity to the core region: the more border traders have to cover, the 
higher the uncertainty regarding the availability of transfer capacities. An example: 
change in the Hungarian/Balkan demand can drive the coupled CZ/SK/HU prices and 
can deviate it more from German prices. So prices in countries further from the core 
markets can deviate more from Central European prices. The coupling and NTC 
allocation mechanism could play a significant role in this process.  
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The impact of high level of RES employment on the market integration process is also 
assessed by Glachant - Ruester (2014). They also highlighted the importance of 
uncoordinated national policies on RES support and capacity mechanisms. 
The absolute level of prices influences the price differential as well: the smallest price gap is 
in 2010 when prices were the highest in Germany and in Central Europe. This diminishing 
price difference is likely to be explained by the fact that at higher prices gas fired CCGTs are 
the price setting plants in both markets. Both fuel price and technology efficiency are similar 
in the case of this technology regardless the country of operation, so price difference reduces 
to the minimum. 
Price convergence analysis 
As we are interested in the longer term impacts of the market integration (rather than what 
happens on the hourly spot market) we have applied a simple method to assess the level of 
market integration and to identify the ‘hotspot’ borders. We define regions (European sub-
markets) of high price convergence using two alternative indices for each border: 
• Yearly average utilisation rate, 
• Sum of square of the difference between two countries day-ahead baseload prices 
(price convergence index).5 
Utilisation rate is calculated by dividing the commercial day-ahead schedule by the net 
transfer capacities: the higher the utilization rate is, lower the market integration between the 
two countries. Sum of square is calculated as the difference between the daily baseload prices 
of the bordering countries and reflects the price differences between neighbouring countries. 
Our analysis does not provide full coverage of the continent due to data limitations. There are 
65 borders within the ENTSO-E region (assuming one country is one node) but our analysis 
includes the utilisation rates for those 51 borders where ENTSO-E publishes data on. The two 
price convergence indices are calculated only for 39 borders based on the availability of 
electricity exchange prices or electricity exchanges that can potentially provide transparent 
price information: the most recent data available for a majority of the electricity exchanges is 
from 2014 as this is the dataset we used. 
On the basis of these two indices we identify those European borders where price 
convergence is not observed due low NTC values or as a result of lower share of implicit 
allocation method of the given border. It should be noted that high utilisation per se does not 
necessarily mean capacity shortage but can simply signal an efficient utilisation of the 
existing infrastructure (if coupled with price convergence). Using the indices for each border, 
we identify countries, or group of countries constituting a sub-region with high price 
                                                          
5 No price data is included in the analysis on the Netherlands, Belgium and Bulgaria. 
                       
 
 
 
                
   
 
convergence. This market integration assessment is based on individual borders and can 
identify smaller regions that are integrated with each other but not integrated with an outside 
region. As an example we could think of GB and Ireland or Spain and Portugal, which might 
be closely integrated with one another but not to the core continental countries.  
Once we identified these regions, we return to our security of supply analysis and apply the 
same indices to the regions to examine whether clustering the countries on the basis of market 
integration changes their SOS status. 
Figure 3: Utilization rate and price convergence of the analysed European borders 
 
Note: Data can be found in the Annex. 
The figure shows that there is a group of borders with high utilisation rates coupled with high 
price convergence. In these cases the capacity of the available interconnecting infrastructure is 
just appropriate: it is used extensively but does not create a bottleneck for market integration. 
On the other hand, some borders seem to constrain market integration (low price convergence 
and high utilisation rate) and as such should be priorities for infrastructure development plans 
(those above the 70% and 40 000). 
The two methods yield very similar regions that can be considered European sub-markets. 
Some of the difference is explained by the lack of price data (Bulgaria, Ireland, Belgium and 
the Netherlands). Romania is close to both thresholds. In addition, both France, 
DE/CH/CZ/SK and Nordic countries form separate regions. 
                       
 
 
 
                
   
 
Figure 4: Countries below the 10% interconnection level (left) and regions defined by price convergence 
(right) 
  
On the basis of the two indices (utilisation rate and price convergence index) we identify 
those countries that are less integrated with their neighbours. This method uses available 
market information – price convergence between countries and the utilisation rate of existing 
lines – and arrives at different conclusions regarding network development priorities 
compared to the 10% rule of the European Commission. 
We can conclude from the results that both the 10% interconnection level requirement and the 
price convergence index define a single core region: the Central Continental Europe Region 
which is highly integrated with the present cross-border capacities being sufficient to reach 
high price convergence, and performing well concerning both indexes. This region includes 
Austria, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Switzerland, Luxemburg, the Nordic countries 
and Slovakia. Although Hungary satisfies the 10% rule by a high margin, it performs poorly 
according to the price convergence index that excludes Hungary from the core continental 
group. Consequently, its integration to the core market requires further cross-border network 
development and would be essential for the incorporation of the Romanian electricity system 
to the group as well. 
The Polish-Baltic region where all countries are under the 10% interconnection level 
disintegrates to three smaller regions on the basis of price convergence. Estonia joins the 
group of Nordic countries (and hence the core continental group), Latvia and Lithuania 
constitute a separate region, while Poland is still an ‘island’ on the electricity network map. 
The integration of this region to the core countries would require the better interconnection of 
Poland to Germany or the Czech Republic and to Lithuania. The increase of NTC between 
Latvia and Estonia would bring additional benefits. 
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Greece is an additional electricity ‘island’ which is less integrated with its neighbours. 
Although the data is absent on the wholesale prices of its neighbours, its utilisation rate 
defines it as a separate region, which would need higher interconnection levels. A similar 
situation could be observed for Belgium and the Netherlands, where the high utilisation rates 
identify them as a separate region from the core continental one. 
We can conclude the following: 
• By the assessment of individual cross-border relationships we can clearly identify the 
borders defining countries or group of countries that follow an independent price path 
from the continental core region. An independent price path followed by a single 
country or a smaller region would probably also mean independent reaction to ‘shocks’ 
to the system thus imposing additional security of supply risk for these smaller regions. 
• The 10% rule is less suitable to identify these impacts, and leads to inappropriate 
identification of vulnerable countries that require interconnectivity upgrade.  It can 
exclude countries (e.g. Hungary) and it does not provide precise information on which 
borders the interconnection should be reinforced. 
• These results are in line with the results of Pellini (2013) confirming the importance of 
pairwise border-based assessment, as well as the importance of the geographical 
relation of the national electricity markets. Cross-border capacity (CBC) bottlenecks 
could prevent countries in the periphery to join the core continental region if a non-
integrated country is wedged in between them (e.g. case of Hungary and Romania, 
Spain and Portugal, Ireland and the GB).  
Besides identifying individual borders with relatively high price divergence we calculated a 
Europe-wide price convergence value for 2020 in various alternative infrastructure 
developmental scenarios with the help of the European Electricity Market Model (EEMM). 
EEMM is a simulation model of the European electricity wholesale market that works on a 
perfect competition assumption in a stylized manner. EEMM covers 36 countries with rich 
bottom-up representation, where all ENTSO-E countries are modelled in full detail. In the 
electricity production sector 12 technologies have been differentiated. We assume that one 
country is one node, the limit between the countries are represented by NTCs. EEMM models 
the production side at the unit level, which means that at a greater European level almost 5000 
units are included in the model runs. Reaching equilibrium (in prices and quantities) takes 
place simultaneously in the producer and transmission segment. These units are characterized 
by various technological factors, allowing the construction of the merit order for the particular 
                       
 
 
 
                
   
 
time period. In each year we have 90 reference hours to represent the load curve with 
sufficient details for each European country.6  
The three scenarios used are the followings: 
• reference case: completion of new capacities (generation and cross-border) with 
already approved investment plan 
• 10% compliance case: all interconnectors capacities are built so that each MS 
complies with the 10% requirement, and 
• price divergence case: cross-border capacities (CBCs) are built according to the levels 
of price divergence of individual borders. 
We have determined the new interconnectors necessary to comply with the 10% requirement 
on the basis of the price convergence value of the borders. We assumed that the missing 
interconnection capacity of a country is built on the border with the highest price difference. 
We have also fixed the rest of the base assumptions in the scenarios, such as the renewable 
electricity generation and the applied carbon value. The RES generation increase follows the 
indicative path of the NREAPs of the Member States, while the carbon value is set at the 
present 7 €/t CO2 level. 
Figure 5: The additional interconnection capacities to meet the 10 % rule, used in the modelling 
 
                                                          
6 For a more detailed description of the model see Mezősi, Szabó (2014). 
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We have calculated the absolute value of the price difference of each country for the 90 
reference hours of the model to the German price (weighted with the hourly production and 
the consumption of the countries). In the reference case this yields a 4.67 €/MWh price 
difference. If all interconnector capacities are built so that each MS complies with the 10% 
requirement then the difference decreases to 3.9 €/MWh. However, if CBCs are built 
according to the levels of price divergence of individual borders then it is even lower, only 
3.76 €/MWh. 
THE SOS POSITION OF REGIONS DEFINED BY PRICE CONVERGENCE 
In this section we assess the impact of changing the level of analysis (from national to 
regional) on the security of supply position of the countries. Regions are created on the basis 
of price convergence exhibited on the map to the right of Figure 4 (with the exception that 
Ireland-GB and Romania-Bulgaria form common regions). 
Figure 6: The changing SOS positions due to regional level of analysis and the alternative indicator  
 
If Member States are considered by the alternative indicator, and not on a national but a 
regional level, their SOS positions of the depicted countries will change, and this will have 
implications on the their priority status in EU infrastructure funding.7 The results indicate the 
following: 
• The direction of change for all but two countries (RO, BE) deteriorate significantly in 
both indicators. 
                                                          
7 In the chart we have only identified those countries and regions where the change is significant. 
                       
 
 
 
                
   
 
• The peripheral regions (Iberian, British Isles and East-Balkan) are under the 10% 
interconnectivity value just like their individual constituents and the SOS position of 
the smaller countries in these regions (Portugal, Ireland and Bulgaria) – however – 
deteriorates. Ireland and Portugal become critical using the alternative index 
((NTC_I+RAC-PL)/PL) at a 40% threshold level. 
• Whereas Lithuania and Latvia are well above the 10% level  (NTC_I/NGC), if they 
are considered as a region then they are just above this level (13%) and their position 
deteriorates significantly on the basis of the alternative indicator as well (they are well 
connected with each other but not with the rest of Europe). The situation is similar 
with the Netherlands and Belgium, except that the position change is asymmetrical; 
the position of the former worsens in both dimensions, whereas the latter only on the 
basis of the 10% indicator.    
THE DECARBONISATION EFFECT OF THE 10% INTERCONNECTION TARGET 
One of the major justification of well interconnected grids - according to the Energy Union 
package - is that is facilitates the decarbonisation of the generation mix by accommodating an 
increasing amount of renewable generation resulting in lower CO2 emission in the power 
sector. Facilitating the integration of renewable energy into the grid is a stated goal for the 
projects of common interest as well. Edmunds et al. (2014) simulate the GB electricity market, 
analysing the effect of a better interconnection with the neighbouring countries on wind 
penetration to show that better interconnectivity helps to increase the maximal wind capacity 
that can be integrated to the electricity system and hence lower the CO2 emissions.  
Meeus et al. (2013) study on cost-benefits analysis in the context of Energy Infrastructure 
Package argues, on a general level, that in a more integrated system coal-based power 
generation can be substituted by gas plants that in turn reduce CO2 emissions. In addition, the 
consequent reduction of system losses less fossil-based power generation is required.  
However, none of the mentioned literature calculates the effect of a better interconnectivity on 
CO2 emission resulting from the modified production portfolio due to the new trans-boundary 
infrastructure at the European level. In the following, we attempt to quantify the CO2 effect of 
those new infrastructure elements that would be required for the full compliance of the 10% 
interconnectivity requirement of the Energy Union Package with the European Electricity 
Market Model.  
In order to arrive to a workable scenario of the 10% NTC case we have used the assumptions 
discussed above: the missing interconnection capacity is built on the border with the highest 
price difference to meet the 10% threshold (Figure 4) and RES generation (NREAP) and the 
CO2 price are constant (7 €/t CO2). In this way any difference in the CO2 emissions between 
                       
 
 
 
                
   
 
the Reference and the 10% NTC case is only due to the changed pattern of the cross-border 
capacities. The impacts of these cross-border developments are measured on the electricity 
system of 2020. 
The modelling results (Figure 7.) show that CO2 emissions increase in many countries due to 
the higher level of integration. The dominant share of additional emissions is generated in 
Germany, Czech Republic and the Netherlands due to increased coal based generation. In 
Italy, the British Isles and the Iberian Peninsula the failing coal and gas production is 
substituted by import. In France the marginal increase of coal and nuclear is accompanied 
matched by a reduction in gas. 
In sum, better interconnection expands the production possibilities of cheap coal first then of 
some cheaper gas producers as well. More efficient coal power units in Germany increase 
their production more than the Polish coal PPs. 
Figure 7: CO2 emissions change due to new interconnection capacities, Mt CO2. 2020 
 
CO2 emission change, Mt
0
0
0
0
0,4
-0,1
2,824,3
0,5
0,8
0,1
-3,5
0,2
0,3
-6,3
0,4
0,1
0,2
-0,3
-11,8
0
0
0
0
0
-0,1
2,8
0
1,8
-0,8
0,4
0
0
0,4
0,1
0,1
                       
 
 
 
                
   
 
Figure 8: Coal and natural gas production change due to new interconnection capacities, TWh 2020 
 
On the European level the CO2 emissions increase by 13.1 Mt that roughly equates to the 
Estonian, Hungarian or the Irish emission levels from combustion in 2014 
The additional coal generation crowds out gas based production with a marginal increase of 
nuclear output.8 
Table 2: Modelling results for Europe (the whole modelled region) 
  
REF 10% Scenario 
Difference 
ABS REL 
Electricity production, GWh     
Nuclear 819 863 820 855 991 0.12% 
Coal 819 896 841 019 21 123 2.58% 
Natural gas 207 720 185 506 -22 214 -10.69% 
CO2 emission, kt 952 853 966 013 13 160 1.38% 
CONCLUSIONS 
This paper had two aims. First it analysed whether the 10% interconnection rule defined by 
the Energy Union Package assesses the security of supply and market integration position of 
the Member States accurately with the goal of achieving a more secure, sustainable and 
                                                          
8 Renewable generation is kept on a fixed growth path in the modelled scenario based on the NREAPs of the 
countries. 
Coal-based power generation 
change, TWh
0
0
0
0
0,4
0
2,324,5
0,5
0,8
0,1
-3,3
0,1
0,4
-4,4
0,3
0,1
0,2
-0,3
-5,8
0
0
0
0
0
-0,1
3,1
0
1,7
-0,7
0,4
0
0
0,4
0,1
0,1
Natural gas based power 
generation change, TWh
0
0
0
0,1
0
-0,2
00
0
0
0
-1
0
-0,3
-4,1
0
0
0
0
-16,3
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
-0,3
0
0
0
0
0
0
                       
 
 
 
                
   
 
integrated EU energy system and market. Second, we analyse the impact of the targeted 10% 
interconnectivity on carbon emissions in the ENTSO-E region. Our hypothesis was that by 
increasing the interconnection levels in countries with excess capacities in coal and lignite 
based generation CO2 emissions would increase in the EU.  
We have proposed an alternative index better capturing the security of supply situation of the 
Member States. This index considers the residual supply capacity to peak load rather than the 
transfer capacity to the generation capacity. So it is more oriented toward load rather than 
production, placing higher emphasis on the ability to securely cover demand while using only 
the reliably available generation capacities. The two indices arrive at significantly differing 
country classifications. Whereas there is a core group that performs poorly according to both 
indicators (Poland, GB, Spain, France and Germany), on the basis of our indicator the group 
of critical countries is extended to Belgium, Finland, Norway and Hungary (at the 40% 
threshold). Portugal, Italy, Ireland and Romania on the other hand exit the group of vulnerable 
countries, as they have relatively large generation capacities and are less reliant on import. 
We have also defined regions that follow a different level of integration with neighbouring 
countries based on the price convergence indicators of the respective borders. The regions are 
defined based on their price integration measured by the price convergence indicator and the 
utilisation rate of interconnectors at each border. We have identified a group of core countries 
of continental Europe already reaching a high level of market integration, including Austria, 
Czech Republic, France, Germany, Switzerland, Luxemburg, the Nordic countries and 
Slovakia. The rest of the countries are classified as regions less integrated to their neighbours 
according to relative price developments (Italy, Hungary, Romania, Poland) or as pairs of 
countries integrated with each other but less integrated with the continental core group (e.g. 
Portugal and Spain, GB and Ireland and the Baltic countries). Based on this regional 
classification, we recalculated our security of supply indicator demonstrating the need to 
include additional countries to the group of vulnerable countries. Not only Bulgaria and 
Portugal, but also the Netherlands and Belgium move closer to meeting the ‘vulnerable’ group 
criteria. 
This assessment also shows that country level analysis of market integration can be more 
refined if replicated at a regional level. Some European countries integrate bilaterally with a 
neighbour but still fail to integrate to the greater European energy markets by extension. 
These countries, e.g. the Baltic countries, GB and Ireland and the Iberian Peninsula still 
constitute ‘energy islands’ even though some of them comply with the 10% interconnection 
rule. An additional insight is that regional electricity market integration is better derived from 
the analysis of individual borders. 
                       
 
 
 
                
   
 
Lastly we have assessed the impact of increasing cross-border capacities on CO2 emissions 
under the assumption of full compliance with the 10% rule. The findings are in line with our 
hypothesis, that – if all other kept constant – carbon emissions will increase in Europe due to 
the availability of presently cheap coal and lignite fired power capacities. Interestingly, the 
increase from coal based production is not concentrated in Poland as we expected but in 
Germany, due to its higher efficiency plants and better connectivity with its neighbours. It has 
to be emphasized, that this analysis assesses the impact of the NTC increase exclusively, 
something that can be easily overridden by changes in those other factors, e.g. by higher 
carbon prices or by higher penetration of RES-E that are kept constant in this assessment. 
REFERENCES 
• ACER/CEER (2014): Annual Report on the Results of Monitoring the Internal 
Electricity and Natural Gas Markets in 2013 
• Armstrong, M. & Galli, A. (2005): Are day-ahead prices for electricity converging in 
continental Europe? An exploratory data approach. Cerna Working Paper  
• Bunn, D.W. & Gianfreda, A. (2010): Integration and shock transmissions across 
European electricity forward markets. Energy Economic, 32, 278–289. 
• Castagneto-Gissey, G., Chavez, M., De Vico Fallani, F. (2014): Dynamic Granger-
causal networks of electricity spot prices: A novel approach to market integration. 
Energy Economics, 44, 422–432. 
• Edmunds, R.K., Cockerill, T.T., Foxon, T.J., Ingham, D.B., Pourkashanian, M.: 
Technical benefits of energy storage and electricity interconnections in the future 
power system. Energy, 70, 577-587 
• Glachant, J.M. & Ruester, S. (2014): The EU internal electricity market: Done 
forever?. Utilities Policy, 30, 1-7. 
• Gouveia, J. P., Dias, L., Martins, I., Seixas, J. (2014): Effects of renewables 
penetration on the security of Portuguese electricity supply. Applied Energy, 123, 438-
447. 
• Kaderják, P. (Ed.) (2011): Security of energy supply in Central and South-East Europe, 
Budapest 
• Meeus, L., v Fehr NHM, Azevedo, .I, He, X., Olmos, L., Glachant, JM. (2013): Cost 
benefit analysis in the context of the Energy Infrastructure Package. Final report of 
Think project 
                       
 
 
 
                
   
 
• Menezes, L. M. de & Houllier, M. A. (2014): Reassessing the integration of European 
electricity markets: A fractional cointegration analysis. Energy Economics, 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.eneco.2014.10.021 
• Mezősi, A. & Szabó, L. (2014): Model based evaluation of electricity network 
investments with regional importance. 2014 11th International Conference on the 
European Energy Market (EEM) 
• Pellini, E. (2013): Convergence Across European Electricity Wholesale Spot Markets: 
Still a Way To Go. SEEC 
• Portugal-Pereira, J, Esteban, M. (2014):  Implication of paradigm shift in Japan’s 
electricity security of supply: A multi-dimensional indicator assessment. Applied 
Energy, 123, 424-434. 
• Zachmann, G. (2008): Electricity wholesale market prices in Europe: Convergence?.  
Energy Economics, 30, 1659–1671. 
  
                       
 
 
 
                
   
 
ANNEX 
 
 
Border
Sum of 
square
Utilization Border
Sum of 
square
Utilization
IT-AT 166 039 99% DK_W-DK_E 4 180 n.a.
LT-SE 164 580 n.a. DK_W-SE 4 063 n.a.
FR-IT 136 808 97% AT-CZ 2 199 39%
ES-FR 133 093 91% DE-CZ 2 199 40%
GB-FR 122 397 98% CZ-SK 1 890 58%
CH-IT 109 569 94% PT-ES 922 43%
LV-EE 91 425 89% LV-LT 2 16%
SE-PL 86 468 100% DE-AT 0 n.a.
DE-PL 67 508 n.a. GR-BG n.a. 100%
IT-SI 67 458 86% IE-GB n.a. 99%
PL-CZ 64 385 n.a. NL-NO n.a. 96%
PL-SK 60 613 n.a. GR-MK n.a. 93%
AT-HU 52 818 74% NL-DE n.a. 92%
IT-GR 47 291 78% RS-AL n.a. 86%
HU-RO 44 917 62% MK-BG n.a. 86%
SK-HU 44 859 75% FR-BE n.a. 81%
AT-SI 41 186 100% RO-RS n.a. 75%
DE-SE 21 213 72% RS-MK n.a. 69%
CH-AT 19 027 85% RS-BG n.a. 67%
DE-CH 19 027 61% BA-ME n.a. 47%
SE-FI 16 114 86% RO-BG n.a. 57%
FI-EE 15 731 52% HU-RS n.a. 50%
FR-DE 15 432 72% BE-NL n.a. 61%
DE-DK_W 15 214 80% RS-ME n.a. 34%
DE-DK_E 14 214 81% SI-HR n.a. 34%
DK_W-NO 12 212 n.a. HR-RS n.a. 32%
FR-CH 10 706 77% HU-HR n.a. 25%
DK_E-SE 8 956 n.a. BA-RS n.a. 20%
NO-SE 5 768 n.a. HR-BA n.a. 21%
